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PLACE OF MAKER'S SIGNATURE ON BILL OR NOTE
Need the maker's signature to a bill or note be at the end
thereof or may it be in the body or elsewhere? The Negotiable
Instruments Law merely provides that, "It must be in writing
and signed by the maker or drawer."' The classic example of
the problem involved was given in an old English case. Is "I,
A. B., promise to pay" as good a note as "I promise to pay,"
subscribed "A. B.?''2 The English court gave cast to the law
vhich has endured until this day when it answered that the
two notes were equally good.3 A quite recent and extensive
annotation sums up the law on the subject thus: "The cases
uniformly agree that the maker's or drawer's signature to a
bill or note need be at no particular part of the instrument.' 4
What answer has the Kentucky Court of Appeals given to
this century-old problem? The Kentucky court had expressed
the opinion obiter, prior to the enactment of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, that the signature need not be at the end or
close of a bill or note. "The name of the drawer is usually
written or subscribed at the bottom of the bill, but this does
not seem to be absolutely indispensable, for if the bill is written
by him, and his name inserted in the body of the bill or is
otherwise signed to it, so that it clearly appears that he is the
drawer, it will be sufficient." 5 While the question has not been
presented to the Kentucky Court since the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, it appears likely that the question
must eventually arise if we may judge from the number of times
it has recently arisen in other jurisdictions.6 The opinion has
been expressed that Kentucky Statutes, section 468 (not a part
of the Negotiable Instruments Law) applies to negotiable instru-
ments and that the signature must needs be at the end.7 The
section of the statute to which Mr. Miller refers reads: "When
'Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec 1, Subsec. 1.
Taylor v. Dobbins (1795), 1 Stra. 399.
3 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Sec. 74; Brannan's Negotiable
Instruments Law (4th Ed.), pages 155, 157; Donohoe's Estate (1922),
271 Pa. 554, 115 A. 878; Knox v. Rivers Bros. (1920), 17 Ala. App. 630,
88 So. 33.
' 20 A. L. R. 394ff.
9 Tevis v. Young (1858), 58 Ky. 197, 71 Am. Dec. 474.
• 20 A. L. R. 394.
'Miller's Kentucky Negotiable Instruments Law, page 26.
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the law requires any writing to be signed by a party thereto,
it shall not be deemed to be signed unless the signature be sub-
scribed at the end or close of such writing."
Is the statute above quoted applicable to the case of bills
and notes? Was it so intended? Should it demand a rule in
this state which is different from the established and uniform
rule in other jurisdictions? The history of the statute itself
may shed some light on these questions.
The agitation of several years for the revision of the stat-
utory law of Kentucky culminated in 1849 when a bill to revise
and codify the statutes was introduced.8 Commissioners were
duly selected for this task and reported their work in 1851.9
The Revised Statutes were finally approved on March 24, 1851,
and took effect July 1, 1852.10 The" section in which we are now
interested was one of the many changes introduced into the
statutes by this revision. It was a section in the subdivision
entitled "Construction of Statutes.""'  As might be expected
the House and Senate Journal of those years show no discussion
of this section. The house and senate were concerned primarily
with such parts of the revision as concerned the salaries of public
officials and topics of like public importance. They were, doubt-
less, more than willing to leave such technical subjects as this
solely in the hands of the Commissioners. Consequently we can
only conjecture as to the reason this section was included in
the revision. Yet in light of the discussion which follows, it
may be well to note the subdivision which contains this sec-
tion follows hard upon the subdivision which contains the re-
vision of the original Kentucky Statute of Wills. Both the
section of the subdivision on construction of statutes and the
section on signatures to wills have survived all later revisions
of the statutes, retai'zing even their exact wording. They form
section 468 and section 4828 respectively of our present statutes.
The original Kentucky Statute of Wills 'adopted the pro-
vision of the Statute of Frauds rather than that of the English
Wills Act as to signature and required merely that the tes-
s House of Representatives Journal (1848-49), page 59.
0 Senate Journal (1851-52), page 96.
"0Acts of 1850-51, pages 212-361.
"Revised Statutes (1852), Ch. XXI, See. 26.
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tator sign the will, not that he subscribe at the end.12  The
case of Sarak Miles Will, decided in 1837,13 construed this
statute thus: "As the Kentucky Statutes of Wills is a substan-
tial transcript of that of Charles IL, the British adjudications
on the Statute of England, prior to its re-enactment here, should
be deemed evidence of the effect which our Legislature intended
that it should have when adopted; and it seems to have been
the well settled judicial doctrine of England, that the writing
of the testator's name, by himself, in the body of the will, or
elsewhere on the same paper, with the design of giving it
authenticity, may be such a signing as the statute contemplated,
and that the subscription of his name at the bottom is not neces-
sary, if it appears that, when the will was attested and pub-
lished, there was no intention thus to subscribe the name."
As mentioned above this original wills statute was revised
at the same time that the section of the statute which Mr. Miller
cites came into the law. The revised statute of wills provided
that the will must be "in writing with the name of the testator
subscribed the-eto."'1 4 The Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1863
gave as the reason for the change: "To remedy the evils result-
ing from this latitudinous interpretation of the statute (as in
the Sarah Miles Will case), the English Statute of 1838 was
passed, introducing an important modification of the former
law as expounded by the courts. It provides that no will shall
be valid unless 'it shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by
the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by
his direction.' Our Legislature, prompted no doubt by the same
motives of policy, adopted the same provision in the fifth section
of the Revised Statutes above quoted. There is a difference in
the verbiage, but none whatever in the meaning, substance and
effect of the two enactments. Our statute, instead of the phrase
'it shall be signed at the end or foot thereof,' uses the equiva-
lent words, 'with the name of the testator subscribed thereto.'
There is no difference between the classical, literal and popular
meaning of the word subscribe when used with reference either
to the execution or attestation of written instruments. To sub-
"Wills, Statute of, 1797, Statute Law of Kentucky, Title 180, Sec.
1, d.
"4 Dana. (Ky.) 1.
"Acts of 1850-51, Ch. 617, Subdiv. III, Sec. 5, also found in Re-
vised Statutes (1852), Ch. CVI, Sec. 5.
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scribe a writing, either as obligor or as attesting witness, is to
sign the writing beneath or at the end or foot thereof. This is
the sense in which the word is used in statutes and by all legal
writers, and it is the sense in which it is popularly under-
stood."1 5
To give such effect to the word subscribe in itself as opposed
to the word sign is against the weight of authority and any such
idea was early exploded by Lord Campbell, C. J.16 Why did
not the Kentucky court mention the section of the chapter on
Construction of Statutes which was equally a part of.the law at
that time? Was it really giving effect to this section by its in-
terpretation of the word subscribe without saying it was so
doing? Was this section placed in the Revised Statues for the
purpose of clinching the change in the wills statute? Was the
section an afterthought to safeguard the somewhat loose phrase-
ology of the revised section of the wills statute? Certain it is
that the Kentucky Court of Appeals later reached the same re-
sult as that reached in the Soward case by reading the two sec-
tions together rather than by relying upon a very artificial con-
struction of the word subscribe.'1 Were the commissioners who
drew up the revision so impressed with the change which the
Wills Act of 1838 had wrought in England that they thought
it well to extend the rule to all writings?
It is likewise interesting to note that almost all of the
adjudicated cases which bear on this section of the statute have
been wills cases. There have been five of these latter.18
To what writings other than wills is the statute applicable ?
It was cited by the court in an affidavit case but this case was
covered rather explicitly by the Civil Code.' 9 A case which
arose two years later was in many respects similar.20 The
opinion was expressed that "the majority verdict of a jury is
regulated by the Kentucky Statutes, and the only provision of
11Bowar v. Bowara (1863), 62 Ky. 126.
"Rloberts v. Phillips (1855), 4 El. & BI. 450; Rood on Wills, Sec.
296. 1TFlood v. Pragoff (1881), 79 Ky. 607; Ward v. Putnam. (1905), 110
Ky. 889, 85 S. W. 179; Graham v. Edward (1915), 162 Ky. 771, 173 Ky.
137.
" Higgins v. Powell (1876), 8 Ky. Opinions; Flooa v. Pragoff, supra
note 17; Ward v. Putnam, supra note 17; Graham v. Bdward, supra
note 17; Lucas v. Brown (1920), 187 Ky. 502, 219 S. W. 796.
SCom. v. Cochran (1911), 143 Ky. 807, 137 S. W. 521.
21 Pugh v. rackson, Jr. (1913), 154 Ky. 772, 159, S. W. 600.
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the Kentucky Statutes as to signature is section 468." Some
nine years after this latter case was decided the Court of
Appebls decided that the statute was limited in its application
to such writings as are contractual or quasi contractual in
nature.2 1 The problem involved in this latter case'was the sign-
ing of the grand jury's report by the foreman. The case is en-
tirely inconsistent with the application of the statute to an
affidavit and a jury's verdict respectively in the two preceding
cases.
The case of Terrell v. Commonwealth has the following to
say regarding the limitation on the application of the statute:
"It will be observed that the writing therein referred to (Ken-
tucky Statutes, section 468) is one which is required 'to be
signed by a party thereto.' This carries with it the irresistible
inference that the writing mentioned was such as required
'parties' to execute it and which conferred rights and imposed
obligations upon those who did execute it, or for, or on whose
behalf it was executed, and includes only such writings as are
contractual or quasi contractual in their nature and to which
there must necessarily be parties." When the court says the sec-
tion includes "only such writings as are contractual or quasi
contractual in their nature," the necessary implication is that
the section does include all writings which are either contract-
ual or quasi contractual in their nature and which are required
by statute to be signed.
There are only two other cases which have been found which
have cited the statute now in question. An extended search has
been made in the various annotations to che Kentucky Statutes
and in the various tables of Statutes Construed in the Digests.
In the first of these two cases there is dictum to the effect that
the statute applies to the memorandum required under the
statute of frauds.22 The question at issue was the sufficiency of
the vendor's signature. While the court dedided on other
grounds that the signature was insufficient, it added the re-
mark: "Moreover, Kentucky Statutes, section 468, provides that
the signature must be subscribed at the end of a writing."
nTerrell v. Com. (1922), 194 Ky. 608, 240 S. W. 81.
2 Kaiser v. Jones (1914), 157 Ky. 609, 163 S. W. 741.
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The only other case citing the statute was decided by the
Court of Appeals on April 29, 1927.23 The sole question pre-
sented by the appeal was whether a deed had been properly
signed by the grantor. Judge Dietzman delivered the opinion
of the court. He expressed the opinion that the signature to
the deed met the general requirement that it be placed there
for the purpose of authenticating the deed and for the purpose
and with the intent of becoming and being bound thereby.
"But," said Judge Dietzman, "section 468 of the Kentucky
Statutes provides:
'When the law requires any writing to be signed by a party thereto,
it shall not be deemed to be signed unless the signature be subscribed
at the end or close of such writing.'"
The fact that the statute has been applied to the memo-
randum of the statute of frauds and to the deed is, of course,
evidence enough of the fact that the statute is not alone appli-
cable to wills even though the latter alone may have prompted
the statute. It is nevertheless worthy of note that the statute
has not yet been applied to writings required to be signed by
statutes enacted subsequent to this statutory rule of the con-
struction of statutes laid down in section 468. The writings in
both of these last two cases were writings which statutes exist-
ing at the date of the passage of the section at hand required to
be signed. The statute of frauds had then been adopted in this
state and required "some memorandum or note thereof, be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by
his authorized agent,"24 Contrary to the English interpretation
of the statute of frauds2 5 but in accord with the interpretation
placed thereon by many American courts,26 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals had held that the statute of frauds also requires that
a deed be signed when it says "any contract for the sale of
lands, tenements or hereditaments. "27
It is obvious that the Negotiable Instruments Law could not
be brought within this qualification of the adjudicated cases on
section 468. While this latter statute was adopted in 1851 the
Negotiable Instruments Law was not adopted in Kentucky until
Gentry's Guardian v. Gentry (1927), 219 Ky. 569, 293 S. W. 1094.
2Revised Statutes (1852), chapter 22, section 1, subsection 7.
Tiffany Real Property, Vol. 2, page 1722.
21 Tiffany Real Property, Vol. 2, page 1723.
2Helton v. Asher (1898), 103 Ky. 730, 46 S. W. 22.
rLACE oF MAREE'S SIGNATURE ON Bnia OR NOTE
1904. We are not overlooking the prospective nature of a
statutory rule of construction, we are merely pointing out the
fact that it has not yet been applied in such a case. The com-
mon law had essentially the same provision as to the signature
of a bill or note in 1851 that the Negotiable Instruments Law
has today, but the section of the statute in question was limited
in its application (by the statute itself to such writings as were
required by statute to be signed. Although this particular sec-
tion employs the word law rather than the -word statute, the
word law is limited by the introductory words of the chapter,
which are also a part of each of the following sections, one of
which is the section at hand. The introductory words are: "In
the constuction of statutes the following rules shall be observed,
unless such construction would be inconsistent -with the mani-
fest intent of the legislature.' '28 That the Court of Appeals
would not have applied this section to the common law of bills
and notes is strikingly evidenced by the case of Tevis v. Young
(1858), supra. This ease arose some six years after the passage
of the section in question and yet it contains dicta of no
equivocal sort to the effect that a bill or note need not be
signed at the end.
We have yet another principle to deal with, which is often-
times invoked to avoid the application of the statute in such a
case. Is this statute inconsistent with the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law? Were there a manifest inconsistency between the
Negotiable Instrunrents Law and this prior statute the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law would control.29 But it is difficult to
see how any such manifest inconsistency here exists. On ihe
other hand the mere requirement of the Negotiable Instruments
Law that a bill or note be "signed by the maker or drawer"3 0
appears rather to invoke the application of the statute than
to avoid it.
But a uniform law such as the Negotiable Instruments Law
is accorded more than ordinary consideration when there is a
question as to whether a prior statute is inconsistent therewith.
An inconsistency between the prior statute and the general
Ky. Stats., Sec. 446.
"Kentucky Negotiable Instruments Law, section 195; Mec7ianics'
Bank v. Katterjohn (1910), 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1071.
' Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 1, Subsec. 1.
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tenor and purpose of the Negotiable Instrument Law. is suffi-
cient to avoid the application of the former.31 But it is
requisite that the inconsistent part conflict with the primary
purpose of the Negotiable Instruments Law.32  Without doubt
the prime objective of the statute was uniformity. "The pur-
pose of the authors of this law was to secure uniform legisla-
tion throughout the United States on the subject of commercial
,paper, so that a person in any one state might by examining the
law on this subject in his own state, be advised as to the con-
•dition of the like law in other states. . . . But uniform
legislation on any subject necessarily loses much of its value
-and usefulness unless it is followed by uniform construction by
-the courts to which the legislation is submitted for construe-
tion."133 It would appear thai the Kentucky court has hitherto
placed such a construction on the Negotiable Instruments, Law
as would be in the interest of uniformity.34 But how coud it be
conducive of uniformity for the court to read section 468 into
the Negotiable Instruments Law? It has already been pointed
out that other states make no requirement that the bill or note
be signed at the end, nor have we been able to find such a statute
as section 468 in any other state.
Admitting, however, for the sake of argument that section
468 is applicable to bills and notes, the question very properly
arises as to how strictly it should be applied. Would a very
liberal application bring the Kentucky law into line with the
established law in other states even if the statute must be
applied? The Kentucky court has shown a marked liberality in
applying the statute to both wills and deeds. This liberality is
accentuated when we consider how stringent the rule appears
on its face: "it shall not be deemed to be signed unless the sig-
nature be subscribed at the end or close of such writing." By
the use of both the word subscribe and the words at the end the
requirement is made doubly stringent. Lucas v. Brown, and
Gentry's Guardian v. Gentry, are examples of this leniency in
application. In the latter case Judge Dietzman said: "The
1 Richards v. "Market Exch. Bank Co. (1910), 81 Ohio St. 348, 90
W. E. 1000.
12Richaras v. Market Exchange Bank Co., supra.
- Finley v. Smith (1915), 165 Ky. 445, 177 S. W. 262, L. R. A. 1915F
v77.Finley v. S'mitz, supra, 8 C. 3. 48.
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reason for this requirement, of course, is that a signature so
placed raises the logical inference that the writing to which it is
thus appended expresses all which the signer wished to authen-
ticate and to which he intended to be bound, and that nothing
has been added to the writing which the signer did not wish so
to authenticate. Therefore, if a signature be sufficiently near
to the end of a writing as to afford a reasonable inference that
the signer intended to indicate that all he wished to authenticate
and to which he purposed to be bound had been fully and com-
pletely expressed, such signature will satisfy the statute. And
in determining whether the signature be so sufficiently near, not
only may we take into consideration the physical position of the
signature, but also the internal structure of the writing to which
it is appended whether, for instance, it is, as written, a logical
whole, and raising the logical inference that it expresses all the
signer wished to authenticate."
In both of the above cases the signature was beneath the
writing although not immediately beneath. In the usual case
of a bill or note with the signature omitted at the end, the sig-
nature does not appear beneath the writing at all. If it did,
the same substantial performance as in the above stated cases
should suffice. There is, however, one will case in which the
signature was not beneath the writing.3 5 The will was written
on a sheet of legal-cap paper. As there was no room at the
bottom of the sheet for the testator's signature, he wrote his
name on the ruled line which runs from the top to the bottom of
the paper, near the left margin, the name being written thereon
beginning at the bottom. The Court of Appeals held that the
signature was sufficient. But even this rule would not be suffi-
ciently liberal to cover the usual bill or note case of this sort. It
would seem that there is no escape from the direct alternative
of applying the statute to bills and notes on the one hand or re-
fusing to apply it on the other.
With such an alternative plainly facing us, we may ask, in
conclusion, if the practical reasons for applying the statute in
other cases are not largely absent in the case at hand. What
could the holder of a bill or note wish to add to the instrument?
Advantageous additions are quite possible perhaps but are
neither as probable nor as serious as in the case of a will or a
Graham v. Edwards, supra.
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deed. It would seem that most additions would but restrict the
negotiability of the instrument, whereas the holder has every
reason to desire that the bill or note remain negotiable. In any
event there is not the same danger of fraudulent additions that
there is in the case of such writings as wills or deeds. Nor is
there as much danger that such additions might remain long
undiscovered and thus allow the chief witnesses of the authentic
writing to die or depart. The frequent circulation and speedy
retirement of negotiable instruments is a safeguard against any
such danger.
But multiply both logical reasons and practical reasons for
refusing to apply the statute as we may, we must ever face the
plain, unambiguous wording of the statute itself. There are
many reasons why the statute should not be applied to bills and
notes; there is but one reason why it should be applied-the
statute itself. And be it desirable or be it undesirable the fact
remains that the latter element usually controls the court. There
is but scant hope that the statute may be avoided.
GEORGE RAGLAND, JR.
Lexington, Kentucky.
